During the summer of 2018, Facebook, Google, and Twi er created policies and implemented transparent archives that include U.S. political advertisements which ran on their platforms. rough our analysis of over 1.3 million ads with political content, we show how di erent types of political advertisers are disseminating U.S. political messages using Facebook, Google, and Twi er's advertising platforms. We nd that in total, ads with political content included in these archives have generated between 8.67 billion -33.8 billion impressions and that sponsors have spent over $300 million USD on advertising with U.S. political content.
INTRODUCTION
Online advertising plays an increasingly important role in political elections. As part of the 2016 U.S. national elections there were a number of controversies regarding an ad-driven propaganda campaign to in uence elections [4] and privacy violations [12] . In response to these controversies, Facebook, Google, and Twi er have all created policies and implemented products to make transparent and archive U.S. political advertisements that have run on their platforms. A report by Upturn points out in their analysis of Facebook's then-proposed political transparency archive plans that providing e ective transparency of only political ads can be tricky in the face of a complex online ad network [31] .
In this paper, we analyze Facebook [5] , Google [11] , and Twitter's [29] political ad transparency implementations along with the political ad data included in each archive. rough the lens of these transparency e orts, we perform what is to our knowledge the rst large-scale analysis of U.S. online political advertising. Our analysis enables us to begin to understand and describe the parts of online political advertising in the U.S. that have been made accessible and transparent. We collected as much data as was possible from these archives, collecting 75% of ads archived by Facebook and 100% of ads archived by Twi er and Google from May, 2018 -October 21 st , 2018. In total, we collected and analyzed over 1.3 million political ads from over 24 thousand sponsors. We additionally connect this data to a public dataset published by ProPublica which was gathered by Facebook users via a browser plugin. e ProPublica dataset provides partial information on how Facebook ads have been targeted to the user seeing them.
Our analysis was hampered by our inability to collect all of the ads in Facebook's transparency archive due to limitations of their current beta API. It was also hampered by Facebook and Google releasing ranges instead of exact impression data. It is also unclear if spend is the best metric for measuring the impact of an online political advertisement. us, there is some level of uncertainty in much of our analysis especially that related to Facebook's platform. We acknowledge that all three of these political advertising transparency archives were rapidly deployed and this has caused some of the issues with what and how it was released. We have worked with Facebook to improve access to the ads in their transparency archive and we hope to work with Google and Twi er so that they can include more political advertisers in their transparency archives.
Given these limitations and biases of our data, we perform an initial large-scale analysis of U.S. online political advertising. As part of this study, we provide information about the audience size of individual political ads based on impression data for each of the platforms. We nd that across all three platforms the majority of political ads are small, costing their sponsors less than $100 USD with 82% of all Facebook political ads costing between $0 -$99.
is con rms and quanti es the prevalence of small likely highly targeted ads that can contain custom political messaging. We also create a taxonomy of political ad types based on their intent (i.e., connect, donation, inform, move) and an e ective ad type classi cation methodology based on labeling URLs included in political ads. Using our methodology, we are able to provide a longitudinal analysis of political ads based on the type of ad. Finally, we are able to identify many likely dishonest advertisers that are not correctly disclosing or are obfuscating the real ad sponsor. We categorize these types of advertisers into quasi for-pro t media companies and corporate astroturfers. We discuss the limitations and weaknesses that enable intentional or accidental deception and bypassing of the current implementations of these transparency archives. Based on our experiences analyzing these transparency archives, we provide several suggestions of how these archives could be made more robust and useful.
We have made as much of the data that we have collected as possible public as well as all of our labeling, data collection, and analysis scripts public. Our initial reports have been the basis for many journalists' stories which have improved online political advertising transparency.
BACKGROUND
Facebook, Google, and Twi er have all deployed political advertising transparency archives. However, each of these transparency archives have di erent criteria for the inclusion of ads and di erent modes of access which we create a taxonomy of in Table 1 . Each of these transparency archive implementations has strengths and weaknesses and there is currently no "best" archive.
Facebook
Google What is an ad? For purposes of this study, an ad is a record in an archive with a unique id assigned by the platform. While each platform has slightly di erent information associated with each record, each has 3 categories of information associated with it: content, context, and results. e contents of an ad consist of any text, images, and/or videos seen by an ad viewer. e context of the ad is the information speci ed by the advertiser about how, when, where, and by whom they want the ad to be seen and how much they are willing to spend for the ad to be seen. Both the content and context of the ad are speci ed by the advertiser at the time of ad creation. e results of the ad consist of information about who ultimately interacted with the ad and when those interactions happened, and how much was ultimately spent on the ad. Not all of this information is made available about each record in any of the archives, but all of this information is made available by at least one archive. Archive Completeness. All archives contain a unique id for each ad, impression counts and amount spent for each advertisement, as well as the dates the ad was active. Facebook and Google release ad impression and spend in ranges and Twi er releasing these as exact numbers. Twi er's implementation of releasing exact impression and spend information from every ad enables us to more precisely measure political advertising on their platform. It would help remove uncertainty if Facebook and Google would also release exact ad impressions and spend amounts instead of ranges. We also note that impressions is an imperfect metric to measure the "reach" of an ad and it would be useful to also include click and other interaction metrics recorded by the platforms. Facebook and Twi er includes the ad text, image, and video content; Google's archive contains a link to a webpage where this content is viewable, but does not contain the content itself. Twi er is the only platform to release targeting information, including whether users were targeted by geography, age, or gender. Facebook and Google have detailed information about how users are targeting for each ad, based on advertiser produced lists of personally identi able information, groups they belong to, demographic or income information that the platform has about the user, geography, or keyword search information, however they do not currently make any of this information available in their archives. Ads Included. Facebook has the most inclusive policy and includes in their archive ads that meet any of the following criteria: "(1) Is made by, on behalf of, or about a current or former candidate for public o ce, a political party, a political action commi ee, or advocates for the outcome of an election to public o ce; (2) Relates to any election, referendum, or ballot initiative, including "get out the vote" or election information campaigns; (3) Relates to any national legislative issue of public importance in any place where the ad is being run; [8] (4) Is regulated as political advertising. " [7] Facebook allows advertisers to opt into including their ads in the archive. In order to enforce their policy, Facebook uses a combination of user reports and machine learning algorithms to "catch" political ads where the sponsor did not opt into making them transparent.
Google is only including "ads related to elections or issues that feature a federal candidate or o ceholder" [11] . Google has stated that they plan on expanding the set of ads included in their archive. It is unclear how Google enforces their policy.
Twi er's original policy was limited to only including ads sponsored directly by federal candidates. However, Twi er has since expanded their policy to include: "(1) Ads that refer to an election or a clearly identi ed candidate. (2) Ads that advocate for legislative issues of national importance. A clearly identi ed candidate refers to any candidate running for federal, state, or local election [30] . " Based on our analysis, it appears that Twi er is currently not enforcing their policy well. Sponsors' Info. Facebook only displays a text string which the sponsor provides and is intended to identify who is paying for the ad. We went through the ve ing process of becoming a political advertiser on Facebook's platform. is entailed uploading a U.S. identi cation card which was approved approximately ve minutes later, at which time we could start posting political ads. Facebook also validates the address of the advertiser by sending them a post card which must be replied to within 30 days or else the advertiser will be suspended. However, during this 30 day grace period political advertisers can post ads without validating their address. We disclosed to Facebook and a subsequent independent experiment by Turton, a reporter from Vice news, showed that Facebook does not currently vet this text string which allowed the reporter to post ads appearing to be from U.S. Senators [27] . is is a security issue that Facebook has acknowledged but claims there is no e ective and scalable ve ing techniques [21] . We will describe the issues that we found with this self-reported text string later in this paper.
Google provides both a text string and a Federal Election Candidate (FEC) ID or EIN (U.S. Tax ID) which is ve ed for every political advertiser in their archive. Twi er provides a text string and, when available, the billing info of the political sponsors. Twi er initially did not vet this information but started ve ing sponsor's EIN similar to Google on September 30 t h , 2018. Providing a consistent and easy to reference identi er such as FEC or EIN for each sponsor enables us to be er study sponsors in Google and Twi er's archive. Viewed Audience. Facebook and Twi er both include break downs on the impression viewing audience by gender, age range, and state level geolocation. Google provides this information as a heat map image that we cannot currently extract this information from for our analysis thus we mark Google as "N/A" for this category. Google has replied that they will work on releasing this information in a format that we can analyze. Targeting Info. Facebook does not include any explicit targeting information in their archive. Google and Twi er makes transparent Age, gender, and geolocation based targeting but do not appear to release other types of targeting criteria, such as audience and content, which are allowed by their advertising platforms. Google also makes transparent some aggregated keyword targeting data. All of the platforms only release partial targeting information, at best, which obscures a key facet of online political advertising. Data Availability. Facebook initially only provided a keyword based portal that was designed for small-scale interactive user exploration of the ads in the archive. Facebook enabled anti-scraping functionality in July 2018 that makes it di cult to collect largescale data by scraping this portal. In September 2018 Facebook released an API that is currently in beta testing which we have access to a er signing an NDA stipulating that we will not publicly release raw data collected from the API. is e ectively means that only a small set of U.S. organizations participating in the API beta test have large-scale data collection access to ads in the Facebook archive.
Twi er has provided an open API and list of all accounts included in their transparency archive which allows us to e ectively collect all ads included in their archive. Google implemented a portal similar to Facebook's and also releases a Big ery (SQL-like) database of all the ads included in their archive which is updated weekly. For our use case of large-scale data analysis this database format is ideal.
DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY 3.1 Facebook
Initially we scraped Facebook's archive using a list of keywords that included elected positions (i.e., governor, judge, senator), U.S. state names, and key political issues (i.e., health care, immigration, taxes). Around the end of July 2018, Facebook implemented anti-scraping measures which blocked our scraper. us, we had no viable means of collecting large-scale ad data until Facebook implemented their API in September 2018. We have publicly released a report and all of the data that we collected by scraping Facebook's archive user portal before our scraper was blocked [17] .
We are part of Facebook's Political Ad Archive API beta testing program [9] which allows us to query Facebook's Political Ad Archive for speci c keyword terms which is matched against the page name, the disclaimer, or ad text. Ads returned by Facebook's API are ordered using a proprietary ranking algorithm that was not described to us how it functions. However, most advertisements appear to be returned in chronological order. A single query to Facebook's API returns at most 1,000 ads and we can page through to collect additional ads using pagination functionality as part of the API. Currently there is a limitation in Facebook's Political Ad Archive API beta that prevents us from paging past 8,000 ads. is is problematic because many searches will return far more than 8,000 results.
Information on spend and impressions per ad is only available in broad ranges. For impressions, the ranges presented are: 0 -999, 1,000 -4,999, 5,000 -9,999, 10,000 -49,999, 50,000 -99,999, 100,000 -199,999, 200,000 -499,999, 500,000 -999,999. For spend, the ranges presented are: 0 -99, 100 -499, 500 -999, 1,000 -4,999, 5,000 -9,999, 10,000 -49,999, 50,000 -99,999, 100,000 -199,999, 200,000 -499,999, 500,000 -999,999.
Additionally, the API has very low rate limits. We have found that functionally, we could make at most 3 requests per minute on average before hi ing these rate limits. Our goal was to create as comprehensive and representative a dataset as possible. Given the very low rate limits and limits on the number of responses for a given search, our approach was to search by advertising page as much as possible in order to reduce the bias in our data. We are currently able to keep up with the rate of new advertisements appearing in Facebook's political ad transparency archive. We cannot publicly release the raw data that we have collected from Facebook's API due to the agreement that we have signed with Facebook as a requirement for access to their API.
We created a separate approach for discovering pages that are linked to sponsored political ads. Our approach to discovering pages involved scraping Facebook's Political Ad Archive user portal interface. We chose a scraping method for page discovery since our access to Facebook's API is highly rate limited and it would be logistically infeasible to perform the queries required for both page discovery and to collect ads using our API access. Our list was not a complete list of advertisers using Facebook's platform since it depends on good coverage based on our keyword searches.
Facebook started publishing a comprehensive list a er the cuto for our data analyzed in this study. Our data collection from Facebook's archive is our best e ort and was incomplete based on analysis of what is contained in Facebook's transparency report. We have changed our data collection methodology moving forward to discover Facebook pages running political ads using Facebook's weekly transparency reports. is combined with improvements we requested and Facebook implemented to their API a er the data collection period for this study will improve our coverage to a mostly complete set of U.S. political ads Facebook has included in their transparency archive.
Google
Google published their archive as a public dataset in a Big ery (SQL-like) format and commi ed to keeping it public. However, we observed that ad spend and impression values for ads, and occasionally advertiser information were being changed a er their entry into the archive. For this reason, we created separate archives of the dataset on a weekly basis. Additionally, ad text information was not available in the dataset itself, but was viewable at a summary page for each ad. We scraped all of these associated pages to collect ad text to be associated in our dataset with the underlying ad data. Unfortunately, many of these summary pages did not render correctly, so we were only able to collect ad text for approximately 66% of pages which contained it. Two separate issues prevented collection. First, some ad pages display the message: "Advertisers are able to use approved third party vendors to serve ads on Google. While we are able to review these ads for compliance with advertising policies, due to technical limitations, we are currently unable to display the content of the ad in the Transparency Report. "
Second, some ad pages displayed the message: "Policy violation is ad violated Google's Advertising Policy." We recommend that Google change their implementation so that ads served by third party vendors or which were deleted for compliance reasons are still accessible through their transparency archive. Google can place a click-through disclaimer to avoid accidental exposure to policy violated content similar to what Facebook has implemented for deleted advertisements.
Information on spend and impressions per ad are only available in broad ranges. For impressions, the ranges presented are: "¡= 10k", "10k-100k", "100k-1M", "1M-10M", "¿ 10M". For spend, the ranges presented are: "¡ 100", "100-1k", "1k-50k", "50k-100k", "¿ 100k". e ads in this dataset are a combination of text-only ads that are displayed alongside Google search results and image or video-only ads that are displayed as banner or sidebar ads on Google's AdSense network.
In addition to per-ad data, Google also published some aggregate data on a per-advertiser and geographic basis. One of these aggregations was exact weekly spend per advertiser. roughout this paper, we present minimum numbers for impressions and spend because both Google and Facebook publish ranges for impressions and spend for each ad, instead of exact numbers. ese total aggregations, give us a sense of how much error there is when we use these minimum estimates for Google. According to Google, advertisers spent $45 M on political ads but our minimum estimate of spending was only $11 M.
Twitter
Twi er publishes a list of all political campaigning advertisers [28] which we scrape daily to discover new political campaign advertisers' Twi er accounts. In addition to this list provided by Twi er, we have also manually a empted to identify every federal election candidates' personal or campaign Twi er account. We then query each account daily using Twi er's API perform to collect updated information on all promoted tweets and detect federal election candidates which are not listed on Twi er's political campaigning advertisers page but are sponsoring tweets. During our scraping, we have noticed that some promoted tweets were deleted and are replaced with the text: " is Tweet is not available because it includes content that violated Twi er Ads Policies. " e information for these deleted promoted tweets is no longer accessible through Twi er's political transparency archive. However, if we have scraped them before they were deleted we have retained the content and information about these promoted tweets. We recommend that Twi er change their implementation so that promoted tweets which were deleted are still accessible through their transparency archive. Twi er can place a click-through disclaimer to avoid accidental exposure to policy violated content similar to what Facebook has implemented for deleted advertisements. We have made public all of the data that we have collected from Twi er's transparency archive.
Additionally, we noted that there were several accounts of federal candidates that were not being archived according to Twi er's policies. We would nd these ads during our regular scrapes for ads by all federal candidates, but no billing or impression data would be available, and the ads would disappear from Twi er's archive a er 7 days, as is typical for non-political ads. We noti ed Twi er about 4 accounts which they subsequently added to their transparency archive. However, Twi er did not retroactively include their prior promoted tweets from these accounts and there are currently 11 additional federal candidate accounts which have promoted tweets not included in the archive.
us, it appears that Twi er's process for agging federal election candidates' account that should be included in their archive is not working correctly. We will disclose this new set of 11 accounts to Twi er and continue to work with them to improve their process for discovering and including relevant promoted tweets in their transparency archive.
DATASETS
We have collected all of the U.S. political ad data that Google and Twi er have made transparent and archived as of October 21 st , 2018. In addition, we have made our best e ort to collect as much of the U.S. political ad data that Facebook has made transparent and archived as of October 21 st , 2018. For Facebook, we are not able to collect all of the ad data from their transparency archive due to the limitations in their API; this is a subset of U.S. political ads that ran on Facebook. Note that our scraper was blocked by Facebook in mid-July, 2018 and we were not able to collect data until the beginning of September, 2018 when we began to use their beta API.
is means that we do not have good coverage of Facebook ads during that period since it is di cult to retrieve older ads from Facebook's current beta API. On October 23rd, 2018, shortly a er we froze our dataset, Facebook released their Ad Archive Report [6] . From this, we know that as of the cuto date for data analyzed in this study, Facebook had a total of 1.67M ads in their archive, from a total of 256M spent across 78K pages. We have captured over 75% of all ads in the archive, but only 49% of the pages.
On the Facebook platform, ads that run without a 'Paid for by' label but are later deemed to be political are removed from circulation and added to the archive. We have been able to nd 96,106 such ads in the archive, with a total spend of at least $42.8 million and 670 million impressions. It does not appear that Google or Twi er have any mechanism for retroactively marking an ad as political if it is discovered a er the fact, and we would encourage them to develop this capacity. 
Additionally, we use a dataset published by ProPublica of political ads that have been viewed by their users who have installed browser extensions that automatically collected advertisements on their Facebook pages and sent them to ProPublica's servers [23] . Table 3 provides an overview of this dataset. We were able to connect ads in the ProPublica dataset to ads in our dataset of archived political ads by mapping the ad IDs used in the ProPublica dataset to the ad archive IDs used in the archive. To do this, we scraped the Facebook's web-based political ad archive, as both the ad IDs and ad archive ids were available. Each record in this dataset contains, among other things, the text of the data, the various targetings received by the di erent users who saw the ad, the page associated with the ad, and the 'Paid by' ad sponsor string associated with the ad. Of the 33,308 ads in the ProPublica dataset with a creation date a er May 7 t h , 2018, the o cial start of the Facebook dataset, we were able to nd 18,010. Because the users who contribute data to this dataset are self-selecting, these ads should not be considered a representative sample of ads in the larger Facebook Ad Archive. Among other things, the average ad spend on ads in this dataset was $644, compared to $107 for the larger dataset.
As part of our analysis, we manually categorized the top advertisers on all three platforms. We categorized these advertisers by organization type (political candidate, Political Action Commi ee (PAC), Union, For Pro t, etc). For Facebook, we were able to classify the organizations of the advertisers who were responsible for at least 75% of the total number of ads in the Facebook archive. For Google, we labeled the organization of top advertisers who were responsible for 80% of the total number of ads, and for Twi er we we were able to label all 88 advertisers with their organization type. We were able to categorize 12,833 of the top ad sponsors. If we were not able to categorize an advertiser, it is marked as 'Unknown'.
We also classi ed the ads themselves into 5 categories: Inform, Connect, Donate, Move, or Commercial. Inform ads seek to persuade the viewer, but do not make an explicit ask. Connect ads seek the user's contact information. Donate ads seek the user's money. Move ads a empt to motivate the user to take some action in the physical world, such as a ending a rally or voting. Commercial ads seek to sell the user goods or services. We classi ed the ads based on the outgoing links from the ads. Ads that had no outgoing links were always classi ed as Inform ads, as they could not have any further ask from the user. Ads that linked directly third-party sites for Ads that linked to general campaign sites were usually multiple-classed as some combination of the three, as these ads and pages typically made multiple asks. Ads by For Pro t Media organizations were classi ed as Inform ads, as these advertisers do not sell goods or services to users. Ads by For Pro t organizations that linked to store sites or sites selling services were classi ed as Commercial. We were able to categorize 907,840 ads with these methods. Heavy use of third-party service providers by advertisers was extremely helpful in making these classi cations. If we were not able to categorize an ad, it was marked as 'Unknown'. We validated this method of ad categorization by taking a random sample of 300 categorized ads from each platform and manually verifying them. e error rate for Facebook was 4%, for Google was 3.7%, and for Twi er was 3.7%
A limitation that applies to all our datasets is that we do not know when the spend and impressions for each ad occurred during the lifetime of the ad. Some ads run for several weeks and some for only a day, but in either case, we a ribute their entire spend and total impressions to the creation date of the ad.
RESULTS
We calculate total spend and impression minimum and maximum for Facebook ads by summing respectively the smallest and largest value for the range given for each ad. For Google, advertiser weekly spend data was aggregated for all advertisers, so we did not have to estimate that number. For Twi er, exact numbers for impressions and spend were available, so no estimation was needed. We also note that we are only able to collect a subset of political advertisements from Facebook's transparency archive due to accessibility issues with their beta API. We stress that because the criteria for inclusion in these archives di ered on the di erent platforms, the gures on relative proportions of ad types and advertiser types should be seen as a re ection of what the platforms chose to make transparent in addition to what is organically present on these platforms.
With that in mind, we can see clear di erences between the platforms. Of particular note is the di erence in ad size visible in Figure 1 , with Facebook having a much larger sized share of the smallest size of ad. Also of note is the di ering prevalence of types of advertisers in Figure 3, 
Data Over Time
e time period during which we were collecting data coincided with the 2018 midterm elections in the United States. us, we were able to observe changing pa erns in spend leading up to a major election. Figure 4 shows spend by week for the 5 month period leading up to the election and Figure 5 shows raw ad count for the same period. We note that our data, particularly for Facebook spend, is right-censored for the nal two weeks.
is is caused by Facebook is right censor e ect also likely e ects Google and Twi er to a lesser degree due to ads with larger budgets that take several days to spend down completely. is can be corrected by periodically rechecking the ads until they have all spent their budgets which is normally within a week. If the paper is accepted, we will update the data to include ads up to the U.S. midterm elections.
We can see the expected increases in the number of ads on all three platforms as the U.S. midterm elections approach. On Facebook's platform there is an increase in connect ads and on Twi er there is an increase in move ads. Both of these are related to sophisticated "get out the vote" e orts that many groups have deployed. ese move ads include images which include speci c polling place addresses and websites that provide polling place directions and information. e connect ads o en provide users with instructions on how they can volunteer to help with early and day-of voter turnout e orts. e cause of the spending spikes for Facebook's platform can be a ributed to a few unknown sponsors that we could not link to a legally registered entity but that were likely quasi for-pro t advertisers which we will discuss further later in the paper. e spending spikes on Twi er's platform can be a ributed to candidates who ran a few ads with larger budgets.
Federal Candidate Comparison
In order to understand how political advertising across these platforms di er, we a empted to create a comparable subset of advertisers and ads. is is di cult because each platform has slightly di erent criteria for inclusion. To do this, we present results for advertising only paid for by candidates for federal o ce, which was the broadest set that was reliably included in all three archives. Note, this does not include ads by current o ceholders who are not seeking re-election or ads that merely mention a federal candidate but are paid for by another party. Results for these advertisers are presented in Table 4 . Table 4 shows that Facebook is the platform with the broadest appeal to federal candidate advertisers, with far more advertisers and ads than Google. However, political advertising by this group on Google appears to generate more spend and possibly more impressions than ads on Facebook. e average ad size on Facebook in terms of impressions and spend are the smallest based on our ese small ads on Facebook are what are called micro targeted, which we de ne as less than 1,000 impressions or a spend of less than $100. For Facebook, microtargeted ads make up 81% of the overall number of ads for federal candidates in our dataset. For Twi er, this number is 62%, and for Google it is 54%. Figure 6 shows the share of ads by size of spend, and here we can begin to see how federal candidates use these platforms in di erent ways. We note that the distribution of ads by size for federal candidates in Figure 6 is very similar to the overall distribution of ads by size seen in Figure 1 . Figure 7 shows the relative spend on di erent ad platforms, where we see very di erent percentages for types of ads. Commercial ads are not shown in this gure because there were too few commercial ads to be visible. Particularly of note is the fact that ads seeking donations were far more common on the Google platform, and ads seeking to spread a message ('Inform') were much more common on Facebook.
Seeing these di erences in both ad size and the types of ads that were run, we wanted to understand if advertisers were trying to reach di erent geographic audiences with di erent types of ads. To do this, we compared the number of regions in which various ads had impressions on Facebook and Twi er, and the number of regions targeted for Google. Figure 8 shows that a variation in targeting strategy is visible on Facebook and Twi er. On Facebook, 'Move' ads that encouraged people to a end a rally, volunteer for a candidate, or some other in-person activity were viewed, on average, in 4 regions, while 'Donate' ads were viewed in 24 regions on average. is makes a certain amount of intuitive sense; people are willing to travel only so far to a end a rally, but can donate to candidates anywhere in the United States. 
Ad Targeting
One of the de ciencies with the Facebook political ad archive is that while it does share geographic and demographic information about who saw a particular ad, we have no way of knowing how that ad was targeted. However we were able to connect our dataset containing information about who consumed ads with one published by ProPublica, which contains some data about how ads were targeted. e ProPublica data was collected by a browser plugin operated by ProPublica which anyone can install. ProPublica's browser plugin [22] uses a supervised Natural Language Processing (NLP) classi er to detect political ads in addition to allowing users to manually classify ads they see as political. e browser plugin then collects the partial ad targeting explanations Facebook provides by automatically clicking on the "Why am I seeing this?" bu on for political ads and sends it to ProPublica for them to make public.
We rst provide a brief background on Facebook targeting audience options [34] . Facebook exposes prospective advertisers to a plethora of options. First, advertisers can target users based on age, gender, location and languages they speak. Second, advertisers can choose to send their ads to users in a custom audience or lookalike audience. Custom audiences contain a list of identi ers of speci c users. Advertisers can use various types of data to create a custom audience list, ranging from specifying the emails, phone numbers or physical addresses of people they want to reach, to users that have visited their website, installed their mobile application, or liked their Facebook Page. Lookalike audiences allow advertisers to let Facebook choose to whom to sends their ads based on previous campaigns. Finally, advertisers can choose from a long list of targeting a ributes the characteristics they want users who receive their ads to have (e.g., users interested in Catholic Church). Targeting a ributes are categorized in types such as demographics, behaviors and interests. Advertisers can choose multiple a ributes, to target.
A prior study by Athanasioshas, et al. [2] reverse engineered what Facebook chooses to show and the limitations of the ad targeting explanation Facebook provides. is study showed that ad explanations are incomplete; each explanation, shows at most one targeting a ribute (plus age/gender/location information), regardless of how many a ributes the advertisers use. is means that explanations reveal only part of the targeting a ributes that were used, providing us -and the users -with an incomplete picture of Figure 9 : ProPublica Spend by Ad Type the a ributes that advertisers were using. However, in the same study, authors performed a number of controlled experiments that suggest -but not conclusively prove -that there is a logic behind which a ributes appear in an explanation and which do not. Given a targeting audience A obtained from two a ributes a1 and a2, if a1 and a2 come from di erent a ribute categories (e.g. Demographic, Behavior, Interest, etc.), the a ribute shown follows a speci c precedence (Demographics and Age/Gender/Location ¿ Interests ¿ PII based lists ¿ Behaviors). If a1 and a2 come from the same a ribute category, the one that appears in the explanation is the one with the highest estimated audience size. is will result in a systematic under-counting of lower priority targeting types.
ere are two main sources of biases and limitations in ProPublica's dataset. One comes from users that installed ProPublica's plugin and which political ads they were shown. Another is from the way Facebook provides ad explanations. e ProPublica dataset is the only publicly available source of targeting information for Facebook political ads. us, we present these results to provide an initial insight into how Facebook political advertisers are targeting their ads with the understanding of likely biases and limitations.
With these caveats in mind, we proceed to an analysis of the 18,010 ads which we were able to connect between the ProPublica dataset and ours. In Figure 9 , we see that di erent types of ads do indeed rely on di erent targeting strategies. Of particular note is the the divergence of 'Commercial' ads, of which 74% rely on targeting by interest groups, and of 'Donate' ads, of which only 24% do. e average ad size did not di er signi cantly between targeting types, but was signi cantly larger than the average for the Facebook Figure 10 : ProPublica Targeting by Advertiser Type archive as a whole. We believe this to be an artifact of the collection mechanism, which is biased toward nding larger ads. 91% of ads in the overall ProPublica dataset had some kind of geographic targeting, and 92% had age or gender targeting. On average, ads in this dataset had on average 4.1 di erent targeting parameters, so for Facebook these should be thought of as a minimum criteria. By contrast, 58% of ads in the Google archive had no geographic targeting whatsoever and 70% had neither age nor gender targeting.
In Figure 10 , we also see diverging strategies between advertisers, with Political Candidates and PACs making heavy use of custom lists of users and For Pro t and For Pro t Media companies relying far more on targeting users by their interests. Campaigns have numerous potential sources from which to compile lists of users. In addition to their own lists of donors and voter rolls, campaigns can rent lists from other candidates [15] .
Both Google and Twi er o er advertisers similar targeting criteria to what we have described for Facebook, including custom audiences and lookalike audiences. Both even allow targeting of users based on interests, although they infer these interests in di erent ways. Both have made transparent demographic and geographic targeting information for ads in their archive, but without other targeting information, this is an incomplete picture at best. We encourage Google and Twi er to at minimum follow Facebook's example and make transparent to users information about why they have been targe ed for ads that they are seeing.
New Types of Political Advertisers
5.4.1 For-Profit Media. One advertiser type in particular proved to be an interesting outlier. e category 'For Pro t Media' contains advertisers whose ads are not considered traditional news by Facebook (those ads are in a separate part of the archive that we did not include) but have content intended solely to entertain or sway the opinion of the viewer. Over the Facebook dataset as a whole, the average ad sponsor ran ads on 1.6 pages. Advertisers in the for-pro t media category however, ran ads on 3.2 pages on average. We have examined many of these for-pro t media companies to understand why they are running across many Facebook pages. What we have found in numerous instances is unknown for-pro t media companies that appear to be creating disingenuous communities that appear to be "grassroots movements" to target di erent demographics and interests with a combination of paid and organic political messaging.
A good example of this type of advertiser is "New American Media Group LLC".
is ad sponsor ran le leaning ads on 10 di erent pages. ese pages were designed to appeal to di erent demographics ("Melanin" for people of color, " e Soldier Network" for Veterans, "Raising Tomorrow" for parents, etc.) but o en run the same content on multiple pages. While this LLC has an extremely similar name to a now-defunct genuine le -leaning media outlet (New America Media), it appears to have no connection to that prior group, and also appears to have no activity o of Facebook.
While some advertisers in this category were fairly traditional entertainment websites (i.e., Comedy Central), some were "forpro t" companies in name only that appeared to exist for no other purpose other than to spread a particular political message and had no way of generating an actual pro t. We also discovered "News for Democracy" is an LLC that ran le leaning ads on 14 di erent Facebook pages most of which were designed to be appealing to groups with traditionally conservative view points, such as " e Holy Tribune." Journalists investigated this LLC and linked it to MotiveAI which is a liberal political advertising company.
Corporate Astroturfing.
Corporations paying for political advertising is not an entirely new phenomenon and has traditionally been funded through industry trade groups and PACs. However, the reporting requirements by the FCC for U.S. political advertising on television o en made this political messaging traceable to the real sponsor. ese stricter reporting requirements do not apply to online political advertising and the ad-hoc reporting requirements that online platforms have enacted are being abused by corporations and industry trade groups to undo transparency e orts.
We discovered in our analysis 355 ads sponsored by "Citizens for Tobacco Rights" which is not a registered company in the U.S. but does disclose on their website and Facebook page that it is operated by cigare e company Philip Morris. However, someone who only saw the Facebook ad disclaimer would not be able to connect the ads to Philip Morris without further investigation. Other journalists have found instances of oil and insurance lobbying groups that also provided sponsor names that did not match the legally incorporated entity sponsoring the ads [21] . ese organizations are seemingly taking advantage of Facebook's policy of not ve ing sponsor names since some of these entities also ran political ads on Google's ad platform but provided Google with their EIN (tax ID) and correct legally incorporated names of their organizations [21] .
Discussion
e di erent policies, bugs, idiosyncrasies, and security weaknesses of each transparency archive implementation present challenges to our analysis e orts. We nd many of the issues with these archives likely stem from a combination of their hasty creation and the fact that the platforms are still working out how to improve security of these archives such they are di cult to deceive or evade. We will rst discuss issues related to accidentally or intentionally deceiving these transparency e orts and how they might be improved by implementing more robust sponsor a ribution techniques. e second part of our discussion will focus on issues related to bypassing inclusion into the di erent platforms' archives and what can be done to improve these issues.
5.5.1 Sponsor A ribution. e for-pro t political advertisers appear to be the ones that are accidental or intentionally skirting and violating the spirit of online transparency sponsorship disclosure policies. As we discussed in the Ad Targeting section, it's extremely easy for groups such as 'New American Media' to obscure who they actually are from users and researchers.
It is worth noting that such advertising by for-pro t corporations was not legal until the Citizens United Supreme Court decision in 2010 [1] that struck down restrictions on election spending by for-pro t corporations. However, political messaging advertisers who run ads on television or radio stations governed by the FCC must still report the name and contact information of the business which paid for the ad, including the company's o cers and directors. Such data is published by the FCC in a public database. Political advertisers who send direct mail through the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) must also report their activities through the FEC with similar public disclosure of the name and contact information of the business. e regulations that require such disclosure for ads that mention candidates do not apply to online advertising, largely because the laws that mandate such public disclosures were dra ed before these platforms were as ubiquitous as they have become.
What this means in practice though, is that people who want to publicize a political message can form a for-pro t company for doing so with no intent of making an pro t. As a private company, they do not need to publicly disclose their investors in the way that PACs are required to disclose their donors. en, the for-pro t company can advertise on social media, also without disclosing the legal entity providing the funds to pay for the ad. On Facebook's platform, advertisers can easily mislead when providing the 'ad sponsor' string associated with their ads, either intentionally or accidentally. us, it is e ectively free to circumvent Facebook's transparency implementation. We see numerous instances on Facebook's platforms of this occurring. Sometimes, the unreliability of the ad sponsor label appeared to be caused purely by human error, such as typos or variation during data entry. For example, Donald J. Trump For President, Inc. sponsored ads on both the Donald J. Trump page and the Mike Pence page. However, when sponsoring ads on the Donald J. Trump page, the organization is known as 'Donald J. Trump For President, Inc' and when sponsoring ads on the Mike Pence page, is known as 'Donald J. Trump For President, Inc. '. Facebook has not publicly stated plans to implement additional ve ing of political sponsors. Facebook's argument is that anything they might implement for additional vetting would not be scalable because of their broader inclusion policy which extends to political issue ads [21] . However, this has created a weakness in Facebook's transparency implementation that greatly diminishes its e ectiveness for studying dishonest political advertisers.
Google and Twi er both vet sponsors so companies must either reveal their legally incorporated name, pay existing third-parties to create ads on their behalf, or create shell organizations (i.e., LLC, PACs). We should note that we see instances of political ads on Facebook and Twi er where the sponsor is a third-party advertising agency instead of the actual entity that paid for the ads. is is an example of the complexities of correctly a ributing political ads to the real sponsors. It is clear from analysis that we need more discussion about how to implement sponsorship disclosure and ve ing in a way that makes it practical to deploy at scale and more di cult to circumvent.
Transparency Infrastructure.
As we have noted, we appreciate the speed with which these transparency archives were created. However, the lack of full integration of these archives into the broader ad platforms of these companies is currently hurting the e cacy of these transparency e orts.
We believe that there are ads on the Google and Twi er platforms that would be considered political content that are not included in their transparency archives because their criteria for inclusion are too narrow or their mechanisms for nding this content are insu cient. More research needs to be done into exactly what the general population considers to be political advertising. We would encourage these platforms to create policies and enforcement mechanisms that will make transparent advertising content that the general population would consider political.
We also encountered several technical and policy issues with the archives as they currently exist. Many ads, particularly in the Google archive, were missing content information. Information on spend and impressions were only available in broad ranges from Facebook and Google. No targeting information or very li le targeting information was available from any of the platforms. Facebook required us to sign an NDA that prohibited us from sharing our raw data even with other researchers or even discussing our ndings directly with non-U.S. Persons.
We call on these organizations to re-architect their platforms and policies to support full transparency of all political ads. We realize that making the changes we recommend will require investment of time and money both in the technology of these platforms and the corporate culture of the organizations that own them.
6 RELATED WORK 6.1 Online Advertising Korolova [16] was the rst to point out privacy a acks based on micro-targeted online ads. Followup work has reverse-engineered the targeting options provided by major online ad networks [33] and explored privacy [2] and bias [26] issues of these online ad networks.
ere has also been work on designing improved ad transparency mechanisms [20] . For our study, we leverage this prior work on reverse-engineering online advertising networks' targeting options and how Facebook's ad targeting explanation likely is implemented.
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no systematic analysis of online advertisers to this point likely due to the di culty of collecting large-scale data from online ad networks [13] . One of the only prior large-scale quantitative studies of online advertisers focused on how their strategies e ected conversion rates based on aggregate analysis of advertisers on Microso 's ad network [32] . XRay [18] and Sunshine [19] are two techniques that were created to detect and infer online ad targeting methods. However, these were proof of concept systems and not deployed at large-scale. An initial analysis of Facebook's proposed ad transparency archive implementations pointed out the issue of only including political ads and not revealing targeting information [31] . is report was released before Facebook implemented their transparency archive and therefor did not analyze the ad data archived by Facebook or issues with the actual implementation. We have conducted the rst large-scale analysis of online political advertising based on the data recently made transparent by Facebook, Google, and Twi er.
Political Advertising
Analysis of political television ads has been the focus of most prior political advertising studies likely due to this data being publicly published by the FCC and easy to access [14, 35] . ere is at least one prior study that explored the in uence of political television ads on online discussion [25] . ere have also been studies of investigating the polarization of online political discourse [3, 10] . e closest related to our study is a prior study which showed that uploading political video advertisements to YouTube generated unpaid organic-views and improved their e ectiveness [24] . However, to the best of our knowledge ours is the rst large-scale study of online political advertising.
CONCLUSIONS
We have performed an analysis of the ads that we were able to collect from Facebook, Google, and Twi er's transparency archives related to U.S. politics. Based on the data we collected, we provide an initial understanding and taxonomies of online political advertising strategies for both honest and possibly dishonest U.S. political advertisers. We also point out limitations and weaknesses of the policies and current implementations of these archives. As part of our analysis, we demonstrate how advertisers are intentionally or accidentally deceiving and bypassing these political transparency archives. We provide a concrete list of suggestions that would likely make them more robust and useful for enabling a be er understanding of political advertising. We are actively working with each archive product teams to improve their implementations.
We commend Facebook, Google and Twi er for their e orts so far in improving transparency into political advertising on their platforms. We note the speed with which these archives were made available a er public concern about this issue was raised, and that these transparency e orts have improved a great deal in the short time that these tools have been available. We encourage the platforms to continue to improve.
